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NOTES
AN OMBUDSMAN FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The 1967 session of the Indiana General Assembly saw four bills
introduced to establish an office similar to the ombudsman.' One of these
provided for the creation of a local office,' as contrasted with the more
general trend toward a statewide office. In June 1966, Nassau County,
New York, by resolution of its board of supervisors, had instituted an
ombudsman for that county,3 but the resolution was rejected by referendum on November 7, 1967, when included as a part of a new County
Charter.' Hawaii passed a bill in April, 1967, establishing a statewide
office of ombudsman.'
The ombudsman concept' is that an independent governmental
officer should exist with the sole function of asserting the interests of the
citizen vis-a-vis his government. 7 As one commentator has said,
The

. .

. concept is very simple. It means only that a citizen

1. 1-1. 1234, H. 1246, S. 120, S. 123, 95th Session of Indiana General Assembly
(1967). All failed to be reported from committee.
2. 1[. 1246, supra note 1 [hereinafter cited as Indiana Bill]. Most states have considered an ombudsman with jurisdiction over state government, not local units. See
Aaron, Ombudsman in Utah: The American Proposals, 1967 UTAH L. REv. 32, 49, 50.
3. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1966, at 1, col. 4.
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1967, at 30, col. 6. The vote was 261,000 in opposition to
192,000 in favor. The rejection indicates the need for massive public education in regard
to the concept if it is to be accepted. See note 89, infra. In spite of this defeat, the basic
reasons for the establishment of such an office remain.
5. No. 306, [1967] Hawaii Sesssion Laws 489 [hereinafter cited as Hawaii Acts].
6. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 9-10 (1966), where Professor Gellhorn, who is probably the leading American commentator on the topic, sets forth the
following as common elements of foreign ombudsmen:
1. All are instruments of the legislature but function independently of it,
with no links to the executive branch and with only the most general answerability to the legislature itself.
2. All have practically unlimited access to official papers bearing upon
matters under investigation, so that they can themselves review what prompted
administrative judgment.
3. All can express an ex officio expert's opinion about almost anything
that governors do and that the governed do not like.
4. All take great pains to explain their conclusions, so that both administrators and complaining citizens will understand the results reached.
Presumably, they will 'be likewise typical of any American office. Cf. Hawaii Act § 3.
and Indiana Bill § 3 (c) (item 1) ; Hawaii Act § 11, and Indiana Bill § 10 (item 2) ;
Hawaii Act §§ 14, 17, and Indiana Bill § 6 (item 3); Hawaii Act § 13, and Indiana
Act § 9 (requiring notice of the complainant to the agency, item 4) ; Hawaii Act § 14
(5), and Indiana Bill § 6 (c) (requiring report of opinions and recommendations to
the agency, item 4); Hawaii Act § 15, and Indiana Bill § 9 (requiring notice to the
complainant of the disposition of his request, item 4).
7. See, e.g., GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 9.
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aggrieved by an official's action or inaction should be able to
state his grievance to an influential functionary empowered to
investigate and to express conclusions.'
Out of this process comes an additional equally important
benefit of the institution, i.e., a study of governmental process and procedure with an aim of modifying it so that abuses will be minimized.'
The American proposals have provided the ombudsman only with the
power of publicity, and of investigation and recommendation for legislation to achieve his goals.' Even abroad, where his powers are, in instances, more extensive, he relies primarily upon persuasion and opinion
to achieve his goals."'
The prime justification for the office is that some areas and aspects
of government have lost the confidence of at least a portion of the public. 2 This breach may be justified or unjustified, 8 it may be the result of
misfeasance, nonfeasance, or malfeasance of governmental personnel;14
it may be an element of the fantasy of the aggrieved;" it may be an
inevitable concomitant of a changing society. 6 But it does exist. And
the ombudsman concept is capable of providing at least a partial means of
alleviating the resultant stress17 by providing a legitimate and trusted
8. Gellhorn, Ombudsman. in New Zealand, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1155, 1156-57 (1965).
9. E.g., Christensen, The Danish Ombudsman, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1100, 1111 (1961).
10. See the Hawaii Act, supra note 5, and the Indiana Bill and Aaron, supra note 2.
11. Gellhorn, The Swedish Justitianomibndsmaa75 YALE L.J. 1, 12, 19, 21 (1965)
as to possible abuse by the ombudsman because of lack of review of his opinion, 49-51
as to the use of the press to influence civil servants, 31-34.
12. See, Aaron, snl'ra note 2, at 35, 36, where it is suggested that a loss of confidence by even a small minority would justify an ombudsman type office; and Reich,
The Law of the Planned Society, 77 YALE L.J. 1227, 1229 (1967) :
It is interesting to note a parallel between the concerns of the ordinary citizen, or the practicing lawyer and the so called new left. One of the chief concerns of the "new left" is the alienation of government from the people, and
lack of adequate popular participation in governmental decision making. Organization like Students for a Democratic Society or allies of the housewives
of Morristown (who protested the location of a highway) in that they want
local people to have some say in the action of the highway building. SDS is
also like the housewives in that it has figured no method better than demonstration by which such participation can be brought about.
Conceivably an ombudsman would tend to alleviate the alienation, encourage citizen's
participation and increase citizen's trust in government.
13. Cf., Aaron supra note 2, at 35-36.
14. No effort is made to clarify the possible intervention by the ombudsman among
these categories. Presumably all would occur, although the bulk of his activities would
involve minor problems.
15. Cf., Kass, We Can Indeed Fight City Hall, 19 AD. L. REV. 75, at 83-84 (1966).
16. See Christensen, supra note 9, at 1126, where he suggests, inter alia, that the
change of Denmark from an agricultural to an industrial society was one reason the
ombudsman was adapted willingly to that country's needs, and Jolliffee, The Inevitability
of the Ombudsman, 19 Ao. L. REV. 99 (1966).
17. See Kass, supra note 15, at 79:
On the whole, however, the average individual has very little recourse against
actions taken by his government. There is today a great cleavage between the
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means of seeking redress, 8 or at least the assurance an action was
properly undertaken.' Presently, only limited remedies usually exist
outside expensive litigation. Even if the aggrieved party is willing to go
to court, the question may be non-judicable, or conversely may be galling
but so trivial as to not justify court costs.2" There may be a void or
aberration in legislation or regulation which permits the vexation but
could easily be remedied. Or the potential complainant may be ignorant
of his remedies. 2' In any case, the ombudsman is capable of entering the
gap, and mitigating if not ending the citizen's uncertainty. 2
Foreign Background

The office developed in Sweden after 1809 initially as a countervailing force to the King's power which answered to parliament. 8 Its
spread was slow. Finland, after independence from Russia in 1917,
established a similar office in 1919.24 Thereafter Denmark adapted the
so-called Common Man and his government. Frustration begins to build up, and
we find ourselves seeking some form of "Kigmy" to kick; this may not always
help, but at least we feel better.
18. See note 8 supra, and accompanying text.
19. Kass, supra note 15, at 85:
(T)he unfounded complaint will also be answered with an explanation of the
propriety of the agency's action. In many cases, this is all the complainant
wants-an official explanation, in language that does not smack of government-ese.
20. Id. at 76:
Whether it is the local garbage collector, the state licensing authority, or an
agency of the federal government, all represent a bureaucratic obstacle which
often cannot be hurdled by the average citizen.
21. This will, of course, remain a very real problem with the ombudsman. To this
end, Sweden provides for the teaching of his functions in the schools. Davis, Ombudsmen
in America: Offices to Criticize Administrative Action, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 1057-59
(1961). Finland has experienced considerable problems in familiarizing the public with
the ombudsman's functions, Gellhorn, Finland's Official Watchinen, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
327, 342-43 (1966). In America, those who should be the prime beneficiaries of such an
office would likely be among the last to hear about it and are largely unreachable by traditional means of communication. Thus, the school dropout who runs afoul of school discipline, may become a welfare recipient, probably will deal extensively with police or
prison authorities, use public health facilities, live in neighborhoods with inadequate
governmental services, and be a special victim of surly public servants, probably will
ignore the exhortations of his teachers, or the news media, or circulars printed by the
welfare department. The solution is unclear. Perhaps the traditional methods of information, and effective implementation of the concept, and word of mouth coupled with
an informative campaign carried on by those responsible for current programs in the
war on poverty would suffice. Certainly one grave problem closely associated with a
lack of communications may be a failure to achieve results-even the modest ones properly expected and a consequent rejection of the concept. The willingness to develop
slowly a widely known and used program may be the most essential element for success.
Cf. GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 132.
22. Kass, supra note 15; the psychological impact may be the ombudsman's greatest
impact, particularly in that he will tend to provide an assurance of proper conduct or
a change in its absence.
23. Orfield, The Scandinavian Ombudsman, 19 AD. L. REV. 7, 9 (1966).
24. Id., at 24.
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office to her needs in 1954;2 Norway followed in 1963.26 New Zealand

became the first nation with a common law tradition to create the office
in 1961.27 Great Britain established a similar office in 1967.2" Ireland,
Holland and Canada" have shown varying interest in such an institution.
While it is often the case that public institutions will not prosper in
new environments, ° the ombudsman has done well in somewhat differing systems."' While all foreign experiences have been within the
parliamentary system, there are variances. The most important is that
in Sweden the ministers are much less directly involved in carrying out
administrative decisions, while the ministers in the other European states
have virtually total responsibility for doing so. 2 Equally important, the
New Zealand experience indicates that the system can be adapted to a
common law system 2 while the other systems were civil law ones.
The jurisdiction of the ombudsman over local action varies. Some
nations have created an ombudsman whose functions include only national
offices. 4 Sweden and Finland, however, give him power to investigate
local official acts.3 Denmark extended the authority to local government
amid controversy. 6 Norway 7 and New Zealand do not include local
government within the ombudsman's jurisdiction. Where carried out, the
scrutiny of local officers seems functional and free of problems. 9
The Local Office

A local officer is probably preferable in America.4 ° For a national
office, the population and geographic extent of the nation are obviously
restrictive of potential effectiveness. 4 ' These considerations are obviated
25. Christensen, supra note 9, at 1100; the first Danish Ombudsman was appointed
in 1955.
26. Gellhorn, The Norwegian Ombudsman, 18 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1966).
27. See, Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 1158 and Orfield, supra note 23, at 49.
28. 1967 PUBLIC LAW 155.
29. Rowat, The Ornbldsnan, PROPOSED SCHEMES 173-213 (1965).
30. Id.; MARX, THE IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN INSTITUTIONS 255-63.
31. Orfield, supra note 23, where the adaptation of the Swedish concept to other
nations is discussed in some detail.
32. Petersen, The ParliamentaryCommissioner: A Danish View, 1962 PUBLIC LAW
15, 18-19. Finland has a mixed parliamentary and presidential system, but the office is
less used or less important because others discharge much of his functions. Gellhorn,
supra note 21, and note 47 infra.
33. Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 1155.
34. E.g., Orfield, supra note 23, at 49.
35. Id., at 16 (Sweden) and at 25 (Finland).
36. See Christensen, supra note 9, at 1107-08.
37. Orfield, supra note 23, at 49.
38. Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 1176.
39. Notes 21-22, supra.
40. GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 131 ; Davis, supra note 21, at 1073-74; THE OMBUDSMAN, Report of the Thirty-Second American Assembly, October 26-29, 1967 [hereinafter cited as 32nd American Assembly Report].
41. Davis, supra note 21, at 1073-74.
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at the state level and disappear at the local level. From the point of view
of work load and staffing, a city, county or regional application appears
more fruitful, although a statewide one might well be feasible and useful."
The exact geographic limits of the ombudsman's jurisdiction is an
intriguing problem. Most urban areas encompass more than one jurisdiction, including cities, towns, counties and independent districts. Presumably, also, the rural resident would feel at least an occasional need for
his services. However, many jurisdictions, rural and urban, might not be
willing to pay the salary required to attract a qualified person. One
solution would be the creation of regional ombudsmen by state action.
The political subdivisions of a state are creatures of the state-not independent entities such as the states themselves. Additionally, many of
the functions of the local government are established by state legislation.
Thus, from the overview point of view, the state legislature has some
considerable interest in local actions. Additionally, this proposal has the
virtue of removing the office from local squabbles, political or otherwise,
which might influence the selection or retention of an ombudsman, or his
decision in a particular case. This concept is also harmonious with the
idea of metropolitan government-and might prove conducive to its
development.
Alternatively, if a state ombudsman were created, local political
subdivisions could be given the option of being covered by his authority."3
However, this might fragment metropolitan areas where some services
are area wide. The alternatives, however, could be melded beneficially;
provision for creation of an ombudsman for metropolitan areas could
exist with local option coverage by a state ombudsman remaining for
more sparsely populated areas. Both the decisions should be made by
referendum.
The greatest problem for a local office serving a multiple jurisdiction
area would be the mechanics of selection, if not done by the state. It
should be carried out by legislative bodies," but they might not be coterminous with his authority. The best solution in this situation would be an
adaption of Sweden's selection by a committee of parliament," with their
number being selected from the constituent subdivisions. This solution
might also further a nonpartisan selection. In areas where only one
42. See GELLHORN, suPra note 6, at 131, where both are discussed, and Aaron,
supra note 2, where the American proposals, most of which suggest a state office, are discussed.
43. Aaron, supra note 2, at 50.
44. Cf., GELLHORN, supra note 6, especially item 1.
45. Anderman, The Swedish Justitianombudsman 11 Am. J. ComP. L. 225 (1962).
A committee of forty-eight chosen on the basis of party representation in parliament
makes the selection.
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governmental units exists, selection by the legislators would be the proper
means.
Relation to Other Elements of Government

None of these nations which have an ombudsman has the distinct
separation of powers which marks American government." The division
between parliament and ministers is minimal when contrasted to the
separation of powers in the United States.4" This philosophical concept
might create problems." To meet the problem created by the distinct
branches, certain powers would of necessity be removed from any ombudsman in America. For example, the authority to oversee the courts
would probably have to be totally eliminated, 9 as it has been in the
Hawaii Act"° and in most other proposals."'
Of more pertinence is the degree of intrusion into the executive
46. The philosophical roots of the ombudsman and the American separation of
powers may be quite similar, however see, Jakerskrold, The Swedish Ombudsman 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 1077, 1078 (1961), where he comments on the relationship of Montesquieu's
ideas on checks and separation of power as it influenced the Swedish constitution of
1809. And see, Davis, supra note 21, at 1075, where he says:
The idea rests heavily upon the cardinal principal of check which has played
such an important role in the historical development of protections against unfair
government action. The check is all the more effective because it is made by an
officer with a different focus from that of an administrator whose action is
criticized, and by one who has a much broader perspective.
47. A State Statute to Create the Office of Ombudsman, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 213, 21920 (1965) :
The Ombudsman is generally identified with nations that have parliamentary
systems of government. Some question may therefore arise about the applicability of such an institution to the "presidential" systems of government found in
the United States. But the office fits as well with the separation of powers
theory of American state governments as with the combined powers found in
parliamenary government. The ombudsman was originally created in Sweden
as a means of strengthening the parliament against the royally controlled judiciary. Its purpose was to protect the parliament and citizenry against executive
power. Furthermore, the Ombudsman has operated effectively for almost half
a century in Finland, which has a mixed presidential and parliamentary system
of government.
48. Id. The problem is probably illusory. See the discussion of the foreign background, supra notes 32 and 33.
49. See, Orfield, supra note 23, at 67.
Conversely, the courts would lack the authority to review the activities of the ombudsman. Cf., Hawaii Act § 18 and Indiana Bill § 15; and see 2 HARV. J. LEGIS., sura
note 47, at 226 where § 603 provides that there shall be no judicial review of the ombudsman's acts unless he violates the act creating his office; the reason is:
Since the ombudsman has no power to revise agency actions, it is unlikely that
anyone would be held to have standing to object to his recommendations. ...
This provision is included to guarantee that the ombudsman will not be frequently involved in litigation when an agency disagrees with his appraisal of
its actions. (Id. at 237-38.)
50. Hawaii Act § 2(a) (1).
51. See Aaron, supra note 2, at 48.
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function.52 Review of discretionary acts might need to be restricted,

and political and policy supervision must be minimal. 4 Nor should
power to prosecute be included within his authority." The means of
attaining the ombudsman's goals should be elsewhere. His influence
should be in the power to investigate and to make recommendations

based thereon to the appropriate administrative agency, legislative body,
or other policy making entity that a modification of a rule, law or

customary mode of conduct would be appropriate. 6 In this context, the
element of persuasion of the civil servant would become important." A
highly qualified, respected party might do more to settle an argument
than even a well-informed, articulate, but committed advocate." Likewise, a widely experienced, dispassionate observer may avoid irrelevancies and deal with the essence of a problem where others fail. If

accommodation of the parties was impossible at this junction, the use of
public opinion would become necessary. Potentially this sanction could do

much to modify the position of a recalcitrant public servant. The publicity
might be achieved by the use of a recommendation to a legislative body."
Added to adverse opinion, the possibility of imposed change may result
in as much or more action in an atrophied administrator as any other
52. One method of dealing with the problem is to create a schedule of included
agencies, as has New Zealand, Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 116, and as has been suggested
by some American proposals, Aaron, supra note 2, at 47. The result might be however,
to create a desire to be excluded rather than to simplify the problem as to reluctance of
agencies to be covered. See Note 57 infra, and accompanying text.
53. See Christensen, supra note 9, at 1109, 1110.
54. Davis, supra, note 21, at 1060; but, Professor Davis states:
The Ombudsman must obviously avoid taking positions on questions of
political opinion. . . . He can act successfully only when he keeps informed
opinion with him. But he can still take strong positions. Because of his great
prestige, he can and does lead public opinion on some ideas.
55. E.g., Orfield, supra note 23. Sweden permits this, id., at 14-15, as does Finland,
id., at 25. Denmark permits referral to the appropriate authority for prosecution, but
has left the power essentially unused, Christensen, supra note 9, at 1114, 1115; the same
is true of New Zealand. Gellhorn, supra note 8. The Hawaii Act § 16 provides for referral to appropriate authority.
56. See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
57. The entire question of relation to the civil servant would be a problem. While
civil servants have often opposed the office, they have usually grown to accept it. See,
Christensen, supra note 9, at 1125 where the change in attitude in Denmark is set forth,
and Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 1155-56, where the change in New Zealand's civil servants
outlook from unfavorable to favorable is described. This results from the exposure of
the unjustified nature of most complaints, and the resultant easing of criticism. The
Norwegian civil servants did not object after observing Norway's experience.. Gellhorn,
supra note 26, at 294. Opposition by the police has been met in the United States, note
87 infra, and welfare leaders, Ombudsman, WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE BUREAU INFORMATION BULLETIN 67-6, at 7 (1967).
58. Cf. GELLIHORN sopra note 6, at 16-17 and Davis, supra note 21, at 1075-76.
59. See e.g., Aaron, supra note 2, at 56. The Hawaii Act is unclear. See § 13
dealing with recommendations and § 14 dealing with publication recommendations. The
Indiana Bill, § 14, requires a report to the legislative body, as well as public release of
the report, if the agency does not rectify the situation.
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conceivable approach. It is essential that the ombudsman have this power
if he is to function.
Additionally, he should be regarded as a legislative official, cloaked
with the legislative branch's authority and providing a means of bolstering
the effectiveness of that branch." Both to assure this function, and to
buttress his insulation from political controversies, his selection should be
by a legislative body." Additionally the investigation of the administrative function will be furthered if the executive is not involved in his
selection. 2 Thus, with the exception of the New Zealand office, the
foreign ombudsman is selected exclusively by parliament, or a committee
of that body."2 Further, Hawaii provides for legislative selection.64
However, he must otherwise be independent of the legislature;65
his term must be a reasonably lengthy one66 with removal difficult to
achieve. 7 Hawaii chooses a six-year term,66 which has the added
virtue of not being coterminous with that of the legislative bodies which
select him.66 Likewise an adequate salary must be paid. Foreign institutions, generally establish the salary as that of a member of the Supreme
Court. 0 Hawaii established a salary of $22,000.71 The compensation
should provide financial independence while adding a degree of prestige
to the office, and should aid the necessary development of a tradition of
nonpartisanship and eminence. This would also be well forwarded by
appointing a person of attainment in his profession, probably law, to the
position.72 Finally, a custom of appointing a fairly old man as in Sweden
60.
61.

See Christensen, supra note 9, at 1103-04.
Cf. GELLHORN, supra note 6, especially item 1.

62.

See Aaron, supra note 2, at 43.

But see, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS., supra note 47, at

222, where § 202 of their model act provides: "The governor, with the advice and consent of the [Slenate, shall appoint the [O]mbudsman." And id. at 228-29 where this
method is justified because it is "generally accepted American procedure."
63. See Orfield, supra note 23.
64. The Hawaii Act § 3 provides the ombudsman shall be elected by a majority of
each house of the legislature meeting in joint session. The Indiana Bill § 3 (c) provides for selection by a majority vote of the local legislative authority (which § 2 (i) defines as city council, town board or county council).
American proposals generally
provide for legislature selection. See, Aaron, supra note 2, at 43. But see 2 HARV. J.
LEGIS., supra note 47, at 222.
65. Cf. GELLHORN, supra note 6, especially item 1.
66. Orfield, supra note 23.
67. Id.
68. The Hawaii Act § 3; the Indiana Bill provides a four-year term, § 4.
69. 32nd American Assembly Report, at 7.
70. Orfield, supra note 23, at 14 (Sweden), at 27 (Finland), at 42 (Norway), and
48-49 (New Zealand) and Christensen, supra note 9, at 1104. In New Zealand the ombudsman is paid 4,100 pounds, or $12,300, a sum substantially lower than a Supreme
Court Justice.
71. The Hawaii Act § 3; the Indiana Bill provides for compensation equal to the
county auditors, which varies with population, § 3(d).
72. Anderman, supra note 45, at 226.
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should be followed." This would serve as an added assurance of his
attainment and prestige, as well as partly assuring a lack of future
political ambition. Within the context of these safeguards and selection
procedures for the ombudsman, particularly for the first person to serve
in this office, it should become and remain independent.
Another aspect of government to which the ombudsman would, of
necessity, relate is the proverty programs. To some extent he might
alleviate problems such as inadequate government services74 that are of
concern to community action programs. Additionally, he might relieve
some of the burden of the legal service groups to the poor in areas such
as potential welfare litigation. 9 His intervention in such areas, not as a
protaganist but as an observer without a particular position, might also be
more acceptable to some elements of societies." He might also fill gaps
existing because some questions are not judiciable for some reason"
or because people fear to approach any legal action." In any case, the
poor should extensively benefit from an ombudsman.
Procedure

The bulk of the ombudsman's work should come from complaints
directed to him"9 without charge for the undertaking."0 Written complaints by the aggrieved, without need for an attorney should comprise
the bulk of the workload; however, inquiry on the ombudsman's own
initiative should also be permitted,8 ' as should periodic inspections,
which have proven most effective abroad in the control of penal and
hospital abuses.82
By permitting inquiry on the ombudsman's own initiative the
citizen will be assured that exposds of government malfunction which he
reads in his newspaper, if not treated by other authority, will be reviewed
by the ombudsman, and that an institution's secrecy and administrative
arrangements shall not hide the misconduct of those in authority.8 It
will also render moot, to a large degree, the problem of a time limit for
73. Id.
74. See note 112, infra.
75. See section on WVelfare, infra.
76. See e.g., note 129 infra, and accompanying text.
77. See GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 27-28.
78. Kass, supra note 15, at 77-78:
Even when legal aid systems are helping to defray quick costs, we are discovering that habits and fears are often so deeply rooted that the average citizen does
not want to avail themselves of the court review.
79. Aaron, supra note 2, at 51; Hawaii Act § 7; Indiana Bill § 6 (a).
80. Aaron, supra note 2, at 52; no provision for charge appears in the Hawaii Act
or Indiana Bill.
81. Aaron, supra note 2, at 51; Hawaii Act § 7 (b) ; Indiana Bill § 6 (b).
82. Aaron, supra note 2, at 56.
83. See Anderman, supra note 45, at 229.
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asserting complaints as the ombudsman will, if a limit of say a year is
established, be able to examine violations barred by the limit of his own
initiative. 4
The grave problem of the unjustified complaint can be partially
handled by requiring an opportunity for the agency to reply to the charge
before it is made public.8 5 With a rejection on the merits at this stage
the complainant should be informed with explanation of the reasons for
rejection." This would hopefully prevent an excessive use of the bludgeon
of publicity, 7 while the explanation should at least partially satisfy the
complainant.8 8 To prevent the agency from acquiescing in the ombudsman's decision for fear of adverse publicity, all adverse decisions should
be mandatorially publicized,8" as well as periodic reports with full
statistical information concerning the rejected complaints."
If the complaint goes beyond this initial stage, the problem of access
to the files of the agency arises." In Sweden, an historic right of access
to all files exists." Many American states, as does the federal government, have anti-secrecy laws." However, their effectiveness and scope
are open to some question. To be effective, an ombudsman must have
access to the information which forms the basis of decision; therefore,
his resources must include a broad right of inspection-probabably
unrestricted-at the local level where questions of national security do
not exist. 4 Subpoena power over these records should exist if needed.95
Likewise, compulsory process must exist to summon public employees 6
or other relevant but reluctant witnesses;7 the right to compel answers
84. Aaron, supra note 2, at 53-54.
85. Id. at 55; Hawaii Act § 12; Indiana Bill § 6 (c).
86. Kass, supra note 15, at 86.
87. Cf. The Indianapolis Star, Jan. 22, 1967, at 1, § 2, col. 4. Other Indiana newspapers opposed for the same reason.
88. Kass, supra note 15, at 86.
89. The Hawaii Act is permissive, § 14; the Indiana Bill requires reporting of all
improper activities, § 6 (d).
90. The Hawaii Act requires an annual report § 17; the Indiana Bill contains no
such provision.
91. Aaron supra note 2, at 55-56.
42. See, e.g., Blix, A Pattern of Effective Protection: The Ombudsman 11 How.

L.J. 386 (1965).
93. E.g., IND.

ANN. STAT., §§ 57-601 to 609 (1961) ; and see, Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cmi. L. REv. 761, wherein the federal act, 8
U.S.C. § 552 is discussed. Professor Davis feels that the Attorney General's memorandum
on the act, which follows the House Committee report, would permit greater withholding
of information than is desirable and would prefer an interpretation based upon the Senate
Committee report and a more literal reading of the act.
94. Aaron, supra note 2, at 59.
95. Id., at 55-56; Hawaii Act § 11 (2); Indiana Bill § 10.
96. Aaron, supra note 2, at 56; Hawaii Act, § 11 (1) ; Indiana Bill § 11.
97. Aaron, supra note 2, at 56.
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to questions must also existY Without effective means to gather information not voluntarily furnished, he will remain a mere sham, meaningless to society at large.
An important element of procedure-and the entire ombudsman
concept-is the means of reporting. The individual complainant must be
apprised of the results of the inquiry of the ombudsman, including both
the basis on which the agency's decision was made and on which the
ombudsman made his decision. 9 Additionally, an annual report should
be made to the legislative body creating the ombudsman.' ° This
should serve both as a means to recommend needed legislative changes,
and as a vehicle to highlight both common and extreme problems. More
importantly, it should emphasize patterns of misconduct which can be
corrected by appropriate administrative action.' This quasi-educational
aspect of the ombudsman ishould be as important-if not more so-than
the ad hoc solution of individual grievance, because in this manner new
complaints should be avoided. The report should also bring attention to
the relative lack of reason for complaint by indicating the lack of merit to
many charges. Additionally, the report should provide a means to bring
publicity to the existence of the office, which will be one of the more
difficult problems to surmount." 2
Staff
Staff size exists as a concern, albeit less so at the local level than at
the state or national.' The personal attention of the ombudsman would
tend to give validity to his acts. Personal attention also assures that full
consideration will be given to all problems.' Additionally, it should add
a sort of charisma if not to the individual to the office. 0 ' Therefore, a
limited organization of hopefully high quality but minimal costs should
evolve. It would be most unfortunate if a bureaucracy should develop to
cope with the problems created by bureaucracy, while the concept would
98. Id.
99. Cf. Kass, supra note 15, at 86; Hawaii Act § 15; Indiana Bill § 9.
100. Hawaii Act § 17; Indiana Bill has no such provision.
101. See note 9 supra.
102. See note 84 supra.
103. The desirability of a small staff with the basic control in the hands of the
ombudsman himself is one reason for preferring a local or state ombudsman to a national one. See Davis, supra note 21, at 1073-74; The Hawaii Act provided a limit of
four members in its original form. Hawaii Legislature Standing Committee Report #869,
3 (1967).
104. Id.
105. Cf. GELLHORN, sot/ra note 6, at 48-50 and at 225-27 where he discusses the
"cult of personality," rejects it, and suggests that the ombudsman could be institutionalized. He argues that this is possible without being destructive of the concept and that
the emphasis on the smallness of staff is a faulty conclusion which is not necessarily
drawn from the foreign experience.
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be effectively invalidated." 6
The degree of delegation of authority should also be limited.'
Authority of the ombudsman should generally be exercised by him.
Major decisions should be made by the ombudsman only. Any authority
that is delegated should be for only express periods, and of a limited
nature.'
Similarly, the ombudsman should exercise full control of his
staff without external hindrance." 0 As in other matters, if a locale cannot
find a person for the office who is capable of supervising his own office
0
without external control, the concept should perhaps be scrapped."
The Areas of the Ombudsman's Activities
The scope of activities of an ombudsman is difficult to draw.
Certainly he would be but a segment of the total governmental function."' He might relieve some of the burdens on some parts of government, but this would not be a primary purpose. Hopefully, he would
handle many matters not now litigated or otherwise properly handled,
such as complaints on street conditions, or garbage collection, or park
maintenance." 2 While these subjects are clearly ones that may evoke
bitter grievances and cause much distress, they are seldom the subject
of court consideration or action. Indeed, the aggrieved may feel that no
true remedy exists."' Likewise no redress is readily available for the
occasional brusque or rude conduct of the civil servant." 4 Additionally,
some areas are beyond the reach of the courts because of questions of
standing, or are precluded by policy consideration." 5 Thus, the courts
will not ordinarily order the carrying out of laws by public authorities
106. Cf. Davis, supra note 21, at 1073-74. But see the views of Professor Gellhorn's position, note 105, supra.
107. Hawaii Act § 4; Indiana Bill § 7.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. GELLHORN, supra note 6.
111. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 21, at 1061, 1062, where he notes that (1) good
personnel, (2) procedural safeguards, and (3) administrative and judicial appeals are
essential to a well functioning administrative system, and they are well established in
America.
112. There is some question as to whether these functions are such that the ombudsman should deal with them. Compare Kass, supra note 15, and GELLHORN, supra note
6, where he suggests that this type complaint is now adequately treated. Mayor John
V. Lindsay of New York agrees, asserting that a vigorous mayor using a complaint
commissioner and "little city halls' can do as well as an ombudsman. N.Y. Times, May
12, 1967, at 36, col. 1. However, New York City has experienced a virtual breakdown
of garbage collections. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1967, at 41, col. 1. The cause is apparently
a lack of personnel and equipment which could have been highlighted by an ombudsman
during the decline of service. Fund allocation and other important political decisions
are involved but quaere isn't this the sort of relatively nonpartisan public opinion an
ombudsman could influence, as Professor Davis suggests, supra note 54.
113. See note 83, supra.
114. See Blix, supra note 92, at 386.
115. See GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 25-28.
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when a broad area requiring continued supervision is involved;1 18 as a
result, many areas such as open housing legislation and housing codes
often are ill enforced. There is too often an absence of a completely satisfactory remedy in our present governmental framework. The creation of
an ombudsman to spotlight the nonenforcement of such laws might
result in their implementation, or in a more realistic approach to the
matters involved if the existing laws are not truly enforceable."' In this
manner an ombudsman might have an extended impact upon such
problems of society as ill-maintained slum housing, excessive prices in
slum stores, and an increasingly polluted atmosphere throughout metropolitan areas even though the problems are created and might be solved
11 8
largely by private parties outside his direct responsibility.
Other broad areas presently litigated might be partially involved.
The problems coincident with zoning might, for example, be handled in
some degree by an ombudsman although the entire area could hardly be
so treated. The amounts of money potentially involved in many cases are
probably such as to require settlement in court in view of the parties. The
same is probably true of displacement of citizens for government projects
such as highway construction, university expansion, and urban renewal."' Seemingly the impact upon those uprooted has not been
seriously considered by proponents of these programs in the past with the
result that slight provision is made to cope with the new problems
created. "' But even if a well-conceived master-scheme for handling
displacements were available to avoid general dislocation, individual
hardship might result for those whose property is taken for eminent
116. E.g., State ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, 219 I1. 346, 76 N.E. 570 (1906).
117. Cf. Davis, supra note 21, at 1163-65.
118. The burden created by private activity is probably as much a problem for the
poor person in our society as is governmental action or inaction. Presumably, the enforcers of housing codes could have a salutary effect upon landlords renting substandard
property as could the welfare department upon stores selling to their recipients. See
N.Y. Times, infra note 150, where the adverse effect of illicit case worker activity is
commented upon and N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1967, at 34, col. 2, where the demands of a
group of housewives on Mayor John V. Lindsay for a check on prices is reported.
119. See Reich, supra note 12, at 1227-29 and at 1256-57, where examples of disruptive highway building are given and the N.Y. Times, July 13, 1967, at 1, col. 2, where
it is stated that displacement of Negroes in Newark, N.J., was one of the primary underlying causes for the riots in that city, and the Indianapolis Star, June 5, 1966, at 1, col. 5,
where the formation of a group known as Homes before Highways is reported. This
organization subsequently has opposed the proposed location of interstate highways in
Indianapolis. See also note, The Effect of Statutory Prerequisites on Decisions of
Boards of Zoning Appeals, I IND. LEGAL F. 398 (1968), where changes in Indiana law to
meet this problem and their effect is discussed.
120. Id., and see Comment, Urban Renewal in the Bay Area: The Need to Study
Human Conditions, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 826, 827 (1967) :
Relocation often fails to provide displaced persons with "decent, safe, and
sanitary" housing [as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (c) 1964)1. This deficiency
normally takes two forms-a failure to trace displaced residents and a tendency
to relocate them in substandard housing.
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domain-or those left facing an earthen-embankment as a new neighbor
-which might be mitigated with the assistance of an influential figure,
especially those cases which turn on fairly inconsequential elements. The
following specific areas often not litigated are among those that a local
ombudsman might consider.
Police Review

Review of police action probably has been discussed more often and
intensely than any other matter in connection with the ombudsman.'
The Indiana bill, the Hawaii act and the initial Nassau County resolution
implicitly permitted this, 1 22 although the rejected charter provision in
that county partially exempted the police. "' In actual practice, Sweden
and Denmark have had no adverse effects from review of police activities.' Only conjecture is possible on the effect an ombudsman would
have had on police interrogation, search and such if he had existed as an
alternative to court action."' One can only speculate on the reaction the
American police would have had absent the continuing controversy as to
whether any significant police brutality exists.' Of course, the review
would extend beyond allegations of this sort to areas of inefficiency or
simple rudeness as with other civil servants. 7 However, the controversy
121. See, Davis, supra note 21, at 1074: "If political leaders in any city are searching for a practical procedure to eliminate or reduce police abuses, I think that they may
find the idea of an ombudsman exceedingly attractive," and GELLHORN, sufpa note 6, at
170-96, where this application is developed in some detail.
122. See, the Hawaii Act and the Indiana Bill, where no restriction appears, and
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1967, at 26, col. 1, where the procedure developed by Nassau County's
ombudsman of referring such complaints initially to the police commissioner is discussed.
123. Cf. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1967, at 26, col. 1; the rejected charter required referral to the police commissioner.
124. See Marino, A Detailed Study on the Need for the Office of Public Protector
(unpublished report to the Nassau County Board of Supervisors) 23-24 (1966) and Cahn,
Ombudsman Report (unpublished report to the Nassau County Board of Supervisors)
21-22 (1966).
125. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1960) (Douglas, J., concurring)
There are, of course, other theoretical remedies (to prevent unlawful entry
into a home). One is disciplinary action within the hierarchy of the police system, including prosecution of the police officers for a crime.
Yet as Mr. Justice Murphy said in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 42:
[S]elf scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its exaltation reaches new heights if we
expect a district attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning
violation[s] of the search and seizure clause during a raid the district attorney
or his associates have ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas then sets out other theoretical remedies, and their actual futility
concluding that exclusion is the only effective remedy however, a willingness to suggest
remedial measures and formulate tolerable procedures might have flown from the recommendations of an ombudsman. Accord, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-44 (1948)
(Murphy, J., dissenting).
126. Cahn, supra note 124, states that there has been no complaint by police abroad,
but still recommends their exclusions.
127. See Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161
(1966), wherein some of the author's personal experiences of police stopping and ques-
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has raged and the police have felt cruelly maligned.
Some of the recurring questions and their relevancy to the ombudsman concept are: (1) The singling out of the police for attention. But,
as the New York City Policemen's Benevolent Association has pointed
out, the ombudsman concept does not single out the police for special
attention, and thus the inquiries would not cast aspersions on the police
that would not fall likewise on other civil servants" 2 -all
of whom
presumably are capable of human error or weakness. (2) The problem
of undermining the authority of the chain of command has also been
asserted. 2 ' However, since the ombudsman would have no authority to
punish or to promulgate orders but only to point out and make recommendations to those with this authority on the force, the objection would
seem to be spurious."' (3) The problem of political manipulation of
review boards also has been raised;"' while a politically inclined or
controlled ombudsman could conceibably create a similar problem, such a
political inclination would-or should-destroy the office of itself. 2
and therefore would of necessity be carefully avoided in the context of
police review or otherwise.
The danger to police operations would be illusory if the ombudsman
functioned as he should; if not, the concept should be abandoned.
Small Business
The ombudsman has an especially important function to perform for
the benefit of the smaller businesses. While large concerns are pestered
by regulations, small businesses face decisions upon which their very
existence often depends. Thus when reinstatement was procured by the
Danish ombudsman to a taxi driver whose permit has been unjustly
suspended for thirty days, 2 3 a great injustice was obviously avoided;
any legal remedy might have consumed as much in legal fees as the loss
of business and might have been less than timely. Likewise, in a situation
analogous to our extensively regulated food service industry, the license
tioning are set forth and solutions suggested, among which the ombudsman is not included.
128. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1966, at 1, col. 2 and at 28, col. 1 (editorial) and Nov.
13, 1966, at 85, col. 3. Gellhorn develops the point in WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN 19192 as does Marino, supra note 124, at 22.
129. See Coxe, The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board, 2 LAW IN TRANSITION at
182-83.
130. E.g., Kass, supra note 15, at 77.
131. See Coxe, supv-a note 129, at 102-82.
132. Christensen, supra note 9, at 1109:
It is of prime importance to the ombudsman as an institution that it keeps
from becoming involved in the general political struggle. The institutions will
survive only if it is accepted by all influential groups as impartial and unbiased.
133. Id., at 1119.
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of a kiosk was reinstated in Denmark."' A situation in Indianapolis,
Indiana, involving condemnation of the city market as unsanitary, and its
change to a parking lot resulted in the city winning litigation."' However, the market continues to function with the community unable to
offer a solution-no one seems to really want to close the market; a
number of people regard the shopkeepers' service a unique amenity that
complements the city and oppose closing without an alternative; and no
one can offer an acceptable alternative, so a desired service, but with
substandard sanitation situated on extremely valuable property because of
its location remains dys functionally utilized.
One major aspect of the ombudsman's intervention in such affairs
would be encouragement of uniformity of action by issuers of licenses,
inspectors and similar regulatory activity."' The administrative inspector has been permitted great discretion in entry without warrant, although
it is now more circumscribed."' More so than in the criminal area, the
administrative evolution of such entry is probably desirable, although loss
in business for revocations of licenses or other sanctions and possible
criminal prosecutions may create such potentially damaging situations as
to require rather stringent standards. At any rate, the numerous occasions
that the small businessman deals with the government would be more
pleasant if he were assured of a quick, inexpensive, reliable recourse-a
situation which might also appeal to larger business.
Schools

An area of great concern to the public where there is little judicial
intervention in day to day affairs is education."' The greater controversies, in those areas such as continued segregation, de facto or otherwise, education of the economically or culturally deprived and other
general policy considerations are beyond the potential ambit of the
ombudsman. However, other issues, including specific elements of the
foregoing, are clearly within the limits of his potential operation. The
exercise of discipline is of considerable importance to the child, and
basically is without review.' 39 Ultimate social and monetary consequences
of expulsion are great, but typically no counsel is present at the time of
determination.'
Immediate consequences are also possible including
134. Id.
135. Wetter v. City of Indianapolis, Ind. -,
226 N.E.2d 886 (1967).
136. Cf. note 10 supra.
137. See v. City of Seattle, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967) bars such searchers; however,
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1958), overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 87
S. Ct. 1741 (1967), permitted search of dwelling by health authorities without a warrant.
138. The problem is discussed in Comment, School Expulsion and Due Process, 1
ImD. LEGAL F. 413 (1968).
139.

GELLHORN, supra note 6, at 210 and see, Comment, supra note 138.

140.

Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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financial loss. 4' What to the parent or teacher may be routine could
have extended impact on the child. Or the action may just be of a questionable nature. Thus, the Swedish ombudsman intervened to ameloriate
a situation where a headmaster censored the school paper before publication. "' Similarly, the typical justification of dress regulation, i.e., that
deviant dress creates disorder may be open to some question. 4' 3 A
sensible discussion could often in some cases avoid controversy.
More far reaching social and economic consequences may flow from
other exercises of school disretion. While expulsion may cause irreparable
harm to an individual child, massive misplacement due to intelligence or
other psychological testing with their bias against nonmiddle class
students will have a more dilatorious effect upon the community at
large. 44 Many of the problems inhering in any testing program might
be solved-or alleviated-if a dispassionate observer could intervene
between parents and student on the one hand and the administrative,
counseling, and instructional staff on the other. It is probably better to
develop a testing program acceptable to all elements of a community than
to force a decision upon the courts, leaving the unsuccessful litigants unhappy with their schools, and the schools without a program.
Welfare
The broadening scope of litigation and controversy in welfare
administration is an area of unusual potential for an ombudsman.' 45
Some elements are capable of solution within the context of existent
welfare organization. Thus, recipients in New York City who have
recently demanded that benefits due them under law and regulation be
141. Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966)
in which the court refused to intervene in the expulsion of three high school students
whose "beatle" haircuts were required by a contract with a promoter, which they found
to be voidable under Texas law because of the students' infancy. The promoters uncontroverted testimony indicated that $4,000 had been expended in establishing the trios'
reputation. Interestingly, their repertoire included a song celebrating students expulsion for such a haircut, which the judge set forth.
142. Blix, supra note 92, at 396 set forth the example.
143. See Comment, The Right to Dress and Go to School, 37 U. CoLo. L. REV. 492
(1965).
144. Cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (DDC. 1967).
145. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issue, 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1964), where in it is stated at 1257:
We need organized legal research to examine statutes, regulations, manuals
and practice[s] to determine where changes are needed. We need institutions
capable of financing both legal research and test cases to determine the extent
of rights in given areas. And we need lawyers to represent individual clients
who cannot pay for help or secure that help from an[y] existing organization[s]; it is only through individual cases that the law comes into being and
keeps on growing.
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paid, have had some success." 6 However, this has not been total;
hearings internal to the welfare department as well as litigation are
probably in the offing.14 The prospect is not likely to enthuse the
typical welfare recipient, just as the prospect of such a hearing might
deter a member of the middle class.' 48
Other welfare practices are harder for an ombudsman to reach. The
resident requirements for welfare recipients have recently been invalidated.' 4 9 Due to the existence of statutes, potential costs and political
feeling, it is dubious that this result would have been possible without
litigation. However, there is reason to believe that the decision may be
ignored or begrudingly complied with in some jurisdictions. The ombudsman might well facilitate full compliance. Likewise, the midnight raid
may well continue. 5 ° However, it appears somewhat at variance with
the legislative intent of the aid to dependent children acts; the payments
are aimed to aid the child, who is punished for the mother's indiscretion."' Of course, the mother's right to privacy is likewise
invaded." 2 It is of course dubious that consent is ordinarily given
voluntarily when entry is demanded. While valid considerations may
support the policy being forwarded, due process and a regard for human
dignity call into question the means of implementation. More careful
consideration of these niceties would probably result with an ombudsman
emphasizing them.
This leaves aside the entire question of the adequacy or relevancy of
executing a program. A major function of the ombudsman as observer is
to suggest changes in procedure and rules, as well as possible legislation.
The scrutinizing of programs would benefit all concerned; explanation
of reasons for implementation would also have a positive effect. Certainly
welfare, which is criticized alternately for doing too little and for being
overly generous, could benefit in its public image by the explanations and
recommendations of an unbiased observer.
Finally a more subtle area in welfare operations exists. No one is
146. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1967, at 1, col. 5; see Reich, supra note 145, at 1252-53, in
regard to procedure in welfare determinations-or its absence.
147. N.Y. Times, supra note 146.
148. Cf. Reich, supra note 145, at 1246, where he states:
If even [our] biggest corporations sometimes find government (no matter
how well-meaning) to be arbitrary and oppressive, we may expect to find that
the welfare beneficiary often suffers far more from heavy-handed government
regulation.
149. See Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.C. Conn. 1967).
150. See Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE
L.J. 1347 (1962).
151. Smith v. King, F. Supp.
(S.D. Ala. 1967), 36 U.S.L.W. 3601;
and see Reich, supra note 145, at 1247.
152. Reich, supra note 145, at 1248.
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more incapable of fending off the abusive treatment of a government
employee than one dependent upon that employee for a major portion of
his income. No way of mitigating rude conduct is conceivable within the
ordinary framework of a judicial or administrative system on the cavalier
conduct by a welfare worker in the foregoing situation,15 just as it is
impossible to compensate for the pressures involved in the request for
"permission" to search in the midnight raid.' The oversight of an
ombudsman might serve to alleviate such potential abuses when they exist.
Institutions

An important aspect of the foreign ombudsman's function is the
investigation of custodial institutions, primarily penal and mental
health.' 55 While the first impression may be that it is less a local than a
state or federal problem, the trend may be in the opposite direction.
Presently, petty offenders are imprisoned in local institutions. It is these
offenders who probably are most amenable to be rehabilitated. Yet, the
rehabilitation efforts of local jails are quite limited. The conditions,
albeit transient, should recognize that the "[i]mprisonment will breed
further contempt for the system unless the inmate understands that he is
still human and as such, still has enforcible rights and can successfully
overcome abuses of overzealous or over-cautious prison officials."' 56
Such, however, is not generally the case. While transgressions against
such basic liberties as freedom of religion may be prevented,' the courts
are loath to, look closely at prison complaints because of fear of undermining discipline or encouraging vexatious complaints." 8 The fear is

possibly valid, but the foreign ombudsman has had the wherewithal to
deal with the situation created by the prison complaints." 9
Two classes of persons presently widely imprisoned may be in the
process of creating a new problem. If a person who is an alcoholic lacks
the mens rea.6 ° to be a criminal, what shall be done with him? The
153. The treatment may well not be cavalier, but the recipient may well be abused
because "[T]hey are subject to the social worker's urges to prescribe what is best."
Id. at 1246 (footnote omitted). And see Reich, supra note 145, at 1359-60 and N.Y.
Times, supra note 146, where the discharge of a number of caseworkers because of acceptance of bribes to direct their clients to various merchants is described.
154. Reich, supra note 150, at 1348-50.
155. See, e.g., Blix, supra note 92, at 396 and ANDERMAN, supra note 45, where it
is stated that the Swedish Ombudsman is more active in these areas than the Danish.
156. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REV.
397 (1965).
157. Cf. Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
158. E.g., United States ex rel. Oakes v. Taylor, 269 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
159. Gellhorn, supra note 26, at 312.
160. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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same question arises with the narcotic addict."' The potential lack of an
immediate answer could provide a fruitful field for an ombudsman.
Absent an attorney, the potential alcoholic may face modification of
present practices whereby a charge such as creating a public disturbance
is utilized to jail him. But, even if such practices do not continue under
another guise, such as arrests for creating a public distrubance, a problem
remains. Most cities lack facilities to treat their mentally disturbed at
present. Shall the alcoholic or narcotic addict be treated in these overtaxed facilities, or shall new facilities be created? And, if created, will
they be adequate and properly operated? Abroad, alcoholic treatment centers have been subject to many complaints. 62
In this regard, the present widespread practice of jailing insane or
emotionally disturbed persons before treatment might be expanded to the
alcoholic-a step of remarkably limited progress. The mentally distressed
benefit little from incarceration; deaths do result, both among the
disturbed 6 ' and their fellow inmates.'
Additionally, the psychological
impact upon the mentally distressed may be great. It is doubtful if jail
would be the milieu of choice for treatment of most mental diseases.
Additionally, the expansion of treatment of mental disorders in
community mental health centers or wards of general hospitals presents an
area of inquiry. While the terribly bad condition of previous years has
probably passed from most of these treatment facilities, the possibility of
occasional abuse must remain with such a degree of discretion that is
necessary for the operation of such facilities." 5 In this same regard
161. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), wherein it was held that narcotics
addiction, per se could not be a crime. And see, Comment, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts, 76 YALE L.J. 1161, 1166 (1966):
Civil commitment thus provides an antiseptic way of doing thoroughly what
the criminal law could not do at all. Prolonged incarceration of the sick, barbaric when called "punishment," is now granted respectability on the basis of
"treatment." Unfortunately, this humane therapeutic gloss on confinements of
addicts is invalidated by a very poor prognosis.
The comment concludes a civil commitment under the present New York and California
laws cannot be justified under the police powers or the doctrine of parens patriae,and is
unconstitutional.
162. In Sweden, where alcoholic treatment facilities are relatively extensive, the
ombudsman devoted a considerable amount of his energy to observing them. Blix,
supra note 92, at 396 and Anderman, supra note 45, at 229.
163. The Indianapolis Star, Sept. 1, 1967, at 1, col. 6, the deceased party had been
examined at Marion County General Hospital for mental disorder.
164. The Indianapolis Star, March 25, 1966, at 1, col. 4. The insane party was
acquitted on the grounds of insanity, Marion County Criminal Court No. 2, cause number 661452.
165. DE HARTAG, THE HOSPITAL (1964), describes the poor conditions of Houston:
Jefferson Davis Hospital and states, at 5-6:
It [Jefferson Davis Hospital] was overcrowded, understaffed, its accreditation had almost been withdrawn after a staph infection in its maternity ward
during which sixteen babies had died; but it was probably no more backward,
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public hospitals have been exposed as sometimes extremely haphazard in
their treatment of patients. 6 ' Likewise, the allegation that patients are
used without consent.. 7 in experimental programs is an area that needs
investigation-with either proof of its nonexistence, or the establishment
of a reasonable program wherein the patients' rights are recognized and
controlled experimentation with rational consent is possible.
Conclusion
The ombudsman concept has been successful in northern Europe and
New Zealand, where the feasibility and usefulness of this undertaking
has been established. He is highly praised by the citizens, who, nevertheless, have made a realistic appraisal of his functions and value. As one
writer describes his place in the governmental framework of those
countries which have adopted the idea :1.
The office of the ombudsman is only one element among
others that help to promote the rule of the law and of justice.
It is, however, generally acclaimed to be an important element, and it offers, at least in our [Sweden's] constitutional
and administrative context, very definite advantages. For the
ordinary citizen, he is a tribune to which one may turn with
one's complaint without the need of a lawyer; for the public
servant who has been unjustly criticized he offers rehabilitation.
In a modern welfare state with an expanding administration
and growing latitudes given to it, the ombudsman has a
healthy preventive influence upon officials who might tend to
be high-handed, arrogant, negligent or forgetful of the limits of
their powers. He is in a position, moreover, to assist in bringing
about consistency in the interpretation and application of some
legislation and to -suggest improvements in deficient laws.
politics ridden or neglected than similar institutions of charity all over the
country.
166. See Comment, Cizil Restraint, Men4al Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77
YALE L.J. 87, 88-89 (1967) :
Much of the care received today in our gigantic state mental institutions is
merely custodial. Most of these institutions are woefully overcrowded and include within their walls many senile patients and others who could be more effectively care for elsewhere if society wanted to provide for them. Complicating the situation still further is a severe manpower shortage which includes
both psychiatrists and other personnel such as psychologists, nurses, social
workers, and attendants. Our state mental hospitals have not attracted a sufficient number of trained psychiatrists, who often feel greater professional satisfaction and earned a higher income in private practice. A community attitude
of fear and rejection of the mentally ill complicates this problem (footnotes
omitted).
While the statement concerns state institutions, the same is presumably true of local
mental hospitals.
167. Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV. 99 (1967). Accord, Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 1359 (1966).
168. Blix, supra note 92, at 396.
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In America, safeguards against administrative abuse are extensive
and well-developed."6 9 But there remain areas where inadequate remedies
exist, and considerable improvement can be achieved."' The ombudsman
could well operate in these areas, providing both a remedy for individual
abuses and guidance for future conduct. That the ombudsman concept
can be put comfortably within the American framework, at least locally,
is demonstrated by the Nassau County experiment even though it was
rejected finally. While no miracles 7' should be expected in such an
office and some questions may exist such as whether a qualified person
can be attracted to the office or whether political involvement can be
avoided or whether a tendency toward bureaucracy will develop, such
a concept is worthy of careful and thoughtful consideration and experimental implementation.
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